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INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a key aspect of increased globalization in recent decades. The growth in FDI has been higher than growth in international trade; multinational firms have come to account for about 10 percent of world output and 30 percent of world exports; and a large share of new technologies is developed and controlled by these firms.
FDI has played, and continues to play, a large role in Asian development. China is one of the world's largest recipients of FDI and Japan is a major source. Some countries in the region, such as Singapore, have based much of their development strategy on reliance on foreign multinational firms. Finally, Asia is a prime home to multinational firms' cross-country networks, where different affiliates of a firm produce different parts and components, or assemble such parts and components imported from abroad.
FDI often requires coordinating complicated operations over long distances: input goods and services need to be shipped between different branches of the multinational firm; and coordination and supervision requires visits by staff and a steady flow of information. It is clear that the complexities of operations across national borders put large requirements on the host country economic environment. Countries differ in their ability to attract FDI, depending on characteristics such as infrastructure, trade regimes, labor force skills, and institutional quality.
It should therefore not come as a surprise that inflows of FDI differ substantially among countries in Asia. Indonesia is a country where FDI inflows have been relatively modest, and lower than what would be expected from the size of the country. This paper 3 tries to explain the low inflows of FDI by relating the situation in Indonesia to the experience of other countries in the region. Asia is a heterogeneous region and countries differ in many aspects. This provides a possibility to evaluate the determinants of FDI.
What factors are typically the most important ones in explaining FDI inflows into East Asia?
The paper starts with a description of FDI in East Asia, divided between Northeast and Southeast Asia, and continues with a discussion on the main determinants to FDI in East Asia. Section three includes an analysis of FDI inflows to Indonesia where we compare actual inflows of FDI from different sources with inflows predicted from country characteristics. We continue with a survey of the literature on the impact of FDI on the Indonesian economy. FDI has benefitted the Indonesian economy in various respects and a natural conclusion is that Indonesia would benefit from higher inflows. We then continue with a policy discussion where, on the basis of the previous section on determinants of FDI in East Asia, we examine and discuss possible policies to increase inflows of FDI to Indonesia. The paper ends with a concluding section.
FDI IN THE GROWTH OF DEVELOPING EAST ASIA
The three main regions of the developing world, Asia, except Japan, Latin America, and Africa, have fared very differently since the middle of the 20 th Century. As late as only four decades ago, Latin America had the highest per capita income, there was a good deal of optimism about Africa, and Asia was far behind Latin America. By the early 2000s, Northeast Asian countries had about caught up with Latin America, 4 Southeast Asian countries were not far behind, and some had far outstripped Latin America. Incomes in both groups of Asian countries far surpassed those in Africa.
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Most studies find FDI to have been a source of the rapid growth of some Asian countries. 2 That has been the case for most of the countries in the region, although less so and later for the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, which initially followed the Japanese model of restrictions on foreign-controlled firms and only began catching up to the other countries in the region after 1990.
As can be seen in Chart 1, inflows of FDI to East Asia have risen since the 1970s, with interruptions, and accelerated after the opening of China around 1990. The inflow was set back briefly in the mid-1970s, again in the mid-1980s, and by the 1997 crisis, and then again, by the troubles of the IT industry in the early 2000s, a major beneficiary of the FDI capital inflow. The current financial crisis has left its mark, although through 2008, the aggregate flow to the region had remained remarkably resilient. The inflow declined in 2009, but remained close to the highest levels.
--Chart 1 about here --A crude measure of the role of inward FDI in different East Asian countries is the ratio of the inward stock to GDP, shown in financed productive assets that were located in other Asian countries. They were followed by Vietnam (although we consider that country's published ratios doubtful), Thailand and Malaysia. Indonesia has a substantially lower ratio of FDI compared to these three neighboring countries. With a ratio of about 13 percent, Indonesia is similar to the Philippines and to the latecomers to FDI inflows, Taiwan and Korea.
-- Table 1 about here --An alternative measure of the importance of FDI to a country the ratio to capital formation. This is shown for different periods in 
WHY HAS SO MUCH FDI GONE TO EAST ASIA?
A fundamental criterion for attracting FDI is that the host country welcomes such investments. This has not always been the case in East Asia. Developing countries for a 7 long time used import substitution to encourage formation and growth of domestic firms.
A natural part of this strategy was to restrict access of foreign multinational firms to the domestic market and to use other methods to acquire foreign technology. Japan used this strategy successfully, and that success had a strong impact on development strategies in other countries across East Asia in the 1960's and 70's.
Some Asian countries eventually experimented with a different development strategy, including a stronger reliance on foreign multinational firms. Singapore pioneered this development. When Singapore was expelled from Malaya in 1965 it lost most of its previous domestic market on the Malaysian peninsular and its:
-…original economic strategy, which was reflected in its first …development plan, became inoperative…Clearly, import replacement made no sense for a citystate….the most rapid economic progress seemed to lie in industrialization…The question was how to bring it about. The decision was made to encourage FDI…‖ (Krause, Koh, and Yuan, 1987, p. 3).
The economic success of Singapore inspired other countries in East Asia to liberalize their trade regimes and to encourage the entrance of foreign multinational firms. The FDI regimes still differ among East Asian countries, with some being more open than others, but all countries have become more open to FDI over time (Brooks and Hill, 2004) . The exact reason for a more liberal FDI regime varied among different East Asian countries. In some it was an attempt to augment domestic savings, in others to 8 encourage technology transfer or to get access to international markets for exports (Dobson, 1997) .
As previously mentioned, openness to FDI is a necessary condition for attracting foreign multinational firms, but it is not sufficient. The host country needs to provide an economic environment that is attractive for multinational firms. and National Semiconducters, located production in Singapore already in the 1960s (Sjöholm, 2003a) . They were attracted to Singapore by subsidies but also by an efficient bureaucracy that, for instance, enabled Texas Instruments to start production 50 days after their investment decision (Huff 1994, p. 325) .
Malaysia also became an important destination of foreign electronic companies at a relatively early date. One important location was the southern Malaysian state Johor.
This development was partly a result of strong historically links with Singapore but it was also made possible through liberalizations of trade and border procedures in Malaysia and through investments in infrastructure on both sides of the border (Sjöholm, 2003a, p. 109) . MNEs were able to ship goods back and forward between plants on both sides of the border. Similar networks have over time been spreading to, for instance, China, Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam.
The cost of production is particularly important for location of vertically integrated production networks, and the cost depends on a host of factors including wages, productivity, infrastructure, tariffs, and taxes. The authors in Ando et al. (2006) associate success in participating in these production-sharing arrangements among countries to FDI environments in host countries, especially to the presence of supporting infrastructure, including -costly communications and coordination infrastructure‖ (p. 7).
Labor costs depend on productivity as well as on wage rates. Productivity is highly dependent on the educational level of the workforce and several papers find education and skills of the workforce to be important in multinational firms' location decision. 3 The level of education varies, of course, with the type of production, but even relatively simple manufacturing typically requires at least basic literacy and numeracy.
For more sophisticated production, the skill requirement of the workforce is higher.
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Many East Asian countries were early leaders in the education of their populations. They have, for instance, since the 1960s had high levels of completion of secondary education compared to Latin America, Africa, and South Asia, and high levels of completion of tertiary education relative to all developing areas except Latin America (Barro and Lee, 2010 , Table 3 ). This early lead in education may have been part of the reason for the early attractiveness of some of these countries to investors. One should note, however, that the level of education differs within East Asia with a relatively higher level in Northeast than in Southeast Asia (Booth, 1999a and .
A number of studies try to identify additional determinants of FDI. For instance, Gastanaga et al. (1998) find a general negative effect of corruption on FDI in developing countries. Woo and Heo (2009) examines corruption in eight Asian countries and find also a negative effect on FDI inflows. Hines (1995) , in a study on U.S. FDI, and Wei (1997) , in a study on OECD, arrive at similar findings. The negative effect of corruption on FDI might seem like a paradox considering that large inflows of FDI and high levels of corruption coincides in many East Asian countries. One explanation is that other 12 country characteristics, such as cheap labor and large markets, make up for the negative effect of corruption. Another explanation might be the nature of corruption in East Asia. Rodriguez et al. (2005) examines corruption from two dimensions: pervasiveness and arbitrariness. High pervasiveness of corruption makes it institutionalized and predictable whereas arbitrarily corruption increases uncertainty. Corruption in East Asia tends to be of a predictable sort: firms tend to know who to bribe, and once the payment is done the firm will be free from making similar payments to other actors. Lee and Oh (2007) argues that this predictability is especially important for foreign multinational firms with comparable poor knowledge about local conditions: arbitrariness and uncertainty whether bribery will be favorable hurts foreign firms, with relatively poor knowledge of local conditions, more than local firms.
The -Corruption Perceptions Index‖ published each year by Transparency
International suggests that there have been persistent differences among the regions in the perception of the prevalence of corruption (Table 4) Philippines.
-- Table 4 as a way to address this difficulty. The idea behind these zones is that foreign firms are attracted to certain geographic locations in a country where improvements in infrastructure can be concentrated and where the firms often are given special treatment in terms of taxes and regulations. Typical advantages of locating in EPS's include, lower levels of import and export restrictions, less restrictive labor requirements, lower taxes, 14 liberal ownership regulations, liberal foreign exchange regulations, and access to superior infrastructure and communication technologies (Madani, 1999 (Hofman, Zhao and Ishihara, 2007) .
It seems that EPZ's are particularly important in countries with poor institutions.
In those instances, EPZs will allow foreign multinational firms to overcome some of the domestic regulations and constraints. As countries develop, the situation in the surrounding economy tends to converge to the EPZ's and the role of EPS's tends to decline.
To sum up the above discussion, in all the characteristics described here as attractive to investment by multinational firms, East Asian countries as a group have been, for at least several decades, superior to other developing regions. That has been the case for the education of the labor force, the control of corruption, the atmosphere for conducting business, the reliability of the infrastructure needed for coordinating chains of supply and production, and the willingness to make changes in institutions to attract foreign firms. The result has been a higher presence of foreign multinationals than in other areas of the developing world.
INDONESIA AS A RECIPIENT OF FDI
We have showed that FDI inflows have been large to most countries in East Asia but relatively modest to Indonesia. Another way of describing Indonesia's record in attracting inward FDI is by comparing inward stocks over time with what might be predicted from equations relating the expected inward stock to several possible determinants of inflow of FDI.
In one of these calculations, the variables used for the prediction are the real GDP of the country five years earlier, the growth in real per capita GDP in the previous five years, and a measure of the openness of the economy's trade policy we refer to as -Residual Openness.‖ The measure of -residual openness‖ is the residual from an equation relating a standard measure of openness, the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, to a country's population and land area. It takes account of the fact that larger countries, in terms of both population and land area, trade less, relative to GDP, than small countries with the same degree of deliberate trade restriction. It is an attempt to come closer to trade policy than a simple ratio of trade to output.
An example of such a regression is one for the nominal inward FDI stock in a country in year t based on estimating equation (1):
The actual inward stock of FDI in Indonesia in 1985 as reported in the UNCTAD data base (from www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) was 31 percent of the stock predicted by the equation and reached 40 percent of the predicted stock by 2005, when actual levels 16 for four East Asian countries were higher than predicted levels and only the Philippines had a lower ratio of actual to predicted FDI stock (Table 5 ).
-- Table 5 about here--
The data on aggregate stocks and flows of FDI to individual countries are subject to many problems of measurement and interpretation. For some countries, part of the FDI inflow does not add to the productive assets of the nominal destination country, but flows through to other countries, where the labor and physical capital financed by the flow end up. That is the case, for example for inflows to Hong Kong and Singapore. In other cases, the inflows never reach the supposed destination country, except as notations on accounting statements.
For FDI from the United States, more information is available about the composition and characteristics of the FDI flows and stocks. The main advantage is that we can the study real activities of multinational affiliates rather than looking at financial flows. Predictions of the levels of total employment in U.S. affiliates and employment in manufacturing affiliates can be made, based on the same independent variables as for the total stock of inward FDI, and these can be compared with actual surveys of U.S.
multinationals.
Employment in all U.S. affiliates in Indonesia ranged from about half the predicted level to a peak of 90 percent (not shown). For no other Northeast or Southeast
Asian country was the underprediction of U.S. affiliate employment consistently greater. The composition of U.S. firms' employment in Indonesia was very different from that in other East Asian countries (Table 6 ). The share in mining was much higher, at least over 23 percent, although data suppression conceals the actual level. In no other country in the region was the share over 2 percent. The share in Machinery is particularly low, at less than half of one percent, while in other countries, except the Philippines, it ranged from 2 to 6 percent. Computers and electronic products accounted for less than 1 percent of employment in US firms' affiliates, while the shares in the other countries ranged from 3.5 percent in Hong Kong to over 50 percent in Malaysia. In general, the investment in Indonesia from the United States avoided the manufacturing industries in which technology was important, with the exception of Chemicals, probably drawn to the country by the petroleum investments. Furthermore, the low share of US FDI in electronics suggests that Indonesia is not part of US production networks.
-- Table 6 about here--
The omission of Indonesia from U.S. multinationals' production networks is supported in Table 7 by the low share of sales outside the host country in total sales of manufacturing affiliates in Indonesia. U.S. manufacturing affiliates in Indonesia made about 20 percent of their sales outside the country, while manufacturing affiliates in Taiwan and Thailand made over 45% of their sales abroad and those in the other East
Asian countries except China and Korea made over 50% of their sales outside their home markets.
-- Table 7 about hereWe did also examine inflows of FDI from countries where similar data on activities in foreign affiliates are available. The results above of lower inflows of FDI than what could be expected were largely confirmed. 5 For instance, German FDI in Indonesia was lower than would be expected from a prediction based on FDI in all developing countries, whereas employment in Japanese-owned manufacturing plants in
Indonesia was close to predicted levels.
The variables included in the predictions described above refer to Indonesia as a maket for the investing firms and therefore capture mostly market seeking FDI. However, our results are confirmed in other studies using broader sets of variables that reflect also Indonesia's attractiveness as a location for export-oriented production. 
THE EFFECT OF FDI ON THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY
It would be in Indonesia's interest to increase inflows of FDI only if such inflows benefits the country. We therefore briefly survey the literature on the effects of FDI in Indonesia. Table A1 in the appendix shows a number of studies that look at different effects of FDI.
The empirical literature shows surprisingly consistent benefits of FDI to Indonesia. For instance, foreign firms bring in new production processes or start to produce new products benefits the country and will manifest itself in relatively high productivity in foreign firms. A number of studies show that this is indeed the case:
foreign firms have higher labor productivity and higher total factor productivity than local firms. Moreover, not only the level but also the growth of productivity is high in 20 foreign firms. Finally, all of the listed studies find productivity to be high even after controlling for various firm characteristics, such as size and capital intensities.
Previous literature also shows a clear difference in export intensities: foreign firms are substantially more integrated in the international economy through exports. This is not surprising but a result found in most countries. One interesting finding on Indonesia is that even foreign firms that start producing only for the Indonesian market are more able to switch to export than are local firms.
Foreign-owned establishments in Indonesia pay also higher wages than domestically owned establishments, even given the educational level of their labor forces.
They also pay a higher premium the higher the level of education. Foreign firms' entry thus not only increases wages, but also increases the returns to education and encourages workers' investments in additional education. Accordingly, foreign acquisition of an Indonesian manufacturing plant results in higher wages for the plant's employees. Hence, foreign ownership and foreign acquisition increase wages relative to domestic ownership.
A similar story applies to growth in employment. Foreign firms have relatively high growth in employment and foreign acquisitions of domestic firms increase growth in employment, despite that foreign-owned firms are relatively large and large firms tend to have relatively low growth rates in employment.
The studies in Table A1 Most studies focus on the effect on productivity but there are also two studies on wage spillovers. Almost all of the studies find evidence of positive spillovers: local firms benefit from the presence of foreign firms within the industry or region. For productivity, the positive effect is likely to come from technology spillovers, new technologies and knowledge that are made available for domestic firms, and from increased competition, a pressure to improve to secure market shares and survival. For wages, the positive effect of FDI is likely to be the result both of increased productivity through the discussed spillovers, and thought an increased demand for labor. Since the foreign plants also have higher productivity and pay higher wages than local firms, the two factors together imply that higher foreign presence raises the general productivity and wage level in a province and industry.
POLICY DISCUSSION: HOW COULD INDONESIA ATTRACT MORE FDI?
If faster growth is an important goal of economic policy, it would seem to be in Indonesia's interest to increase inflows of FDI considering the benefits FDI brings in terms of productivity growth, higher wages and strong employment growth. However, the Indonesian attitude towards FDI has always been rather ambivalent. Indonesia's continuing ambivalence toward FDI is reflected in the fact that in each year's review of 6 See also Lipsey and Sjöholm (2005 (Morisset and Pirnia, 1999) . One serious problem is that fiscal incentive schemes are difficult to administer and often lead to corruption (Morisset, 2003) . The past and present problems with the Indonesian Investment Promotion Agency (BKMP) suggest that such fiscal incentive policies run the risk of being relatively inefficient also in Indonesia.
It is therefore more fruitful to address the general business climate in Indonesia.
Our previous discussion on determinants of FDI in East Asia suggested that high levels of education, good institutions, and openness to trade are all important factors in the location decision of multinational firms.
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Education is very poor in Indonesia. The exception is enrolment in primary education which was substantially expanded in the 1970's with the use of public revenues from oil. However, enrolment in tertiary and secondary education has been lower than in most other countries in East Asia (Sjöholm, 2005) . Moreover, there are signs that the quality of education is relatively poor (Jones and Hagul, 2001; Welch, 2007) .
To illustrate the situation, Table 8 shows that educational attainment, as of 2010, is lower, on average, than in any of the other East Asian countries discussed here. The proportion of the population 15 and over with no schooling is far above that in any other of the countries. Only 1.4 percent of the population has completed tertiary education and the average member of the population has had only a little over 6 years of education, the lowest level among these countries. Only in the completion of secondary education is Indonesia ahead of a few of the other countries. The drop from the proportion completing secondary education to the proportion completing tertiary education is 94 percent, the largest among the nine countries. Either little tertiary education has been pursued or many of those that have pursued it have left the country.
-- Table 8 about here--Improved education is important for attracting FDI but it will also affect Indonesia's absorptive capacity; the better the level of education the more Indonesia will benefit from foreign MNEs. The same can be said about the technological capacity in Indonesia. A higher technological capacity would encourages foreign MNEs to upgrade production to higher value added activities in Indonesia, rather than placing such production in other countries, and it would also increase spillovers by facilitating knowledge transfers from MNEs to local firms.
Technological capability is another area where there seems to be large potentials for improvements, which would be positive for attracting FDI. Indonesian technology policies before the Asian crisis were dominated by large high-tech projects in aircraft, shipbuilding, railroads, telecommunications, electronics, steel and machinery. Poor management and a weak scientific and engineering infrastructure made most of these projects fail (e.g. McKendrick, 1992; Hill, 1995; Hill and Thee, 1998; Okamoto and Sjöholm, 2003) . High-tech projects were mostly abandoned after the crisis but no new technology policy has emerged in its place. As a result, Indonesia remains at the bottom of the technology ladder in the region. One indication of the poor state of technology development and technology capability, or perhaps one of the causes, is the very low investment in research and development. The figures shown in Table 9 show that, firstly, R&D as a share of GDP is substantially lower in Indonesia than in the other included countries. Secondly, the share of R&D has declined in Indonesia between 2000 and 2005, whereas it has increased in all other countries.
Another indication of technological capabilities is the extent to which foreign investors choose to perform R&D in their Indonesian affiliates. An indication of that judgment on the part of U.S. multinational firms is given in Table 9 . On average, in 2004, U.S. firms' affiliates in developing Asia spent on R&D about 11 percent of their expenditures for employee compensation. The highest ratios among these countries were about 19 percent in Singapore and Taiwan. In contrast, affiliates in Indonesia spent on R&D an amount equal to only 0.6 percent of their employee compensation, far below the ratios in any other country in the region. The next lowest share was in Thailand, where it was three times as high as in Indonesia. The same stark contrasts can be seen for R&D expenditures per employee, 5 or 6 thousand dollars per employee in the highest countries, Singapore and Taiwan, but only $80 per employee in Indonesia.
-- Table 9 Unfortunately, infrastructure is poor in Indonesia. A report on Indonesia in The Economist in 2009 quoted a Jakarta bank executive as saying that infrastructure had become the top obstacle to doing business in Indonesia among his banks' clients.
-…roads, air-and seaports are inadequate…Electricity generation lags demand…Only 18% of the population have piped water and only 2.5% are connected to a sewer system…Export industries are hindered by a lack of ports…‖ (The Economist, September 12, 2009, pp. 11-12) .
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The crisis in the late 1990's had a negative effect on investments in infrastructure.
However, investments remained very low even after the crisis was over. In 2010, The
Global Competitiveness Report ranked Indonesia only as number 96 in terms of the quality of infrastructure, out of 133 included countries. Some signs of an improvement came in 2009 when the government tried to balance a large drop in external demand by launching a program for major infrastructure investments (Resosudarmo and Yusuf, 2009 ). However, insufficient public funding is only one of many factors that restrain infrastructure development. Other problems that will be difficult to solve include a lack of technical capabilities at responsible local governments, poor coordination between central and local governments and between different regions, and large problems with land acquisitions (Kong and Ramayandi, 2008) .
FDI might be one way to improve infrastructure. Investments by foreign firms in infrastructure, and also in utilities, finance, construction and other non-tradables, are affected by various institutional factors such as competition and pricing policies.
Complex regulations are often required to attract investments in these sectors. Indonesia has a mixed history in dealing with inward investments in infrastructure projects (Wells and Ahmed, 2006) . Lack of administrative capacity, poor regulatory structures and corruption are some of the main causes of failing investments in infrastructure. Wells (2007) suggest some policies to improve upon the investment regime: a closer look at international best practices, a ban on equity arrangements where importantly placed
Indonesians get a share of foreign investments, and an institutional arrangement where only one government agency has the full responsibility to negotiate and make agreements with foreign investors in infrastructure projects.
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The quality of institutions is perhaps the most important determinant to FDI. In a survey of Japanese firms that chose various countries as prospective sites for their foreign manufacturing locations, over 80 percent of those choosing Indonesia listed -Political and Social Environment‖ as a weak point, far more than for any other location , Table 2 .8). Indonesia has traditionally been seen as having some of the world's most corrupt institutions (Butt, 2009 ). The figures in Table 4 supports this view. It is difficult to know exactly how negative corruption is for FDI inflows to Indonesia but there are ample of anecdotal stories of foreign firms who do not invest in Indonesia for fear that corruption will lead to bad-will or with problems with home country authorities (e.g. Wells, 2007, p. 354 ).
There are also reasons why the changing nature of corruption might be negative.
Corruption was high under the New Order regime but it was also highly institutionalized and predictable: once a standard contribution to the Suharto family or its closest allies had been made, the regime made sure that the foreign firms' activities were not disturbed (World Bank, 2003; Lee and Oh, 2007) ). Corruption after Suharto is mainly caused by local governments' regulations (Henderson and Kuncoro, 2004) . Corruption differs 28 between provinces and districts, is highly arbitrarily, and therefore more difficult for foreign multinationals to deal with.
As previously said, the business environment is generally seen to be poorer in Indonesia than in other East Asian countries. For instance, the Foreign Policy magazine Globalization Index is an indicator of investors' perception of the investment climate in different countries and are often said to be closely watched by the international community. 8 Indonesia was ranked as number 86 out of 156 countries and behind all included countries in East Asia except Cambodia and Vietnam.
The government has since 2006 tried to reform the investment climate for foreign firms. Some reforms of particular importance are the equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors and the streamlined application procedures for investment approvals (Lindblad and Thee, 2007) . However, 25 sectors are closed to foreign firms. More importantly, Indonesia still uses ownership sharing requirements for foreign investments (Takii and Ramstetter, 2007) . Ownership sharing has been abandoned in many other countries, since they don't provide any additional benefits to the host economy, and might deter inflows of FDI (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999) . Foreign firms that are afraid of losing their technologies to domestic actors, will think twice before they engage in a joint venture with local actors. As discussed in the paper, openness to trade is another important determinant of FDI, especially for multinational firms with vertically integrated production chains. The trade regime in Indonesia deteriorated after the crisis in 1997-98 with increased corruption at the customs services and with increased time and costs for clearing goods (Athukorala, 2002) . In recent years, the situation seems to be improving. One of the included criteria in the World Bank's doing business survey is trading across borders, which is defined as the documents, time and cost to export and import. Indonesia is ranked as number 45, hence substantially better than its average ranking of 122. It is also better than the ranking of many other countries in the region, and about the same ranking as China (rank 44). A slightly worrying sign, however, is that Indonesia dropped from rank 40 in 2007. Poor integration in the international economy is presumably one reason why Indonesia in not participating in international production networks to the same extent as many other East Asian countries. (Thambipillai, 1998 (Thee and Pangestu, 1998, p. 223) . 
CONCLUDING REMARKS

FDI has been important in East Asia
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A survey of the literature shows that FDI has increased economic growth, wages, export, and employment in the Indonesian economy. What could be done if Indonesia wished to attract more FDI? As global and regional competition for FDI has increased, an FDI regime and an economic environment that were sufficient for attracting FDI some years ago are not sufficient today.
An analysis of determinants of FDI in East Asia gives some guidance: good institutions, a skilled workforce, and openness to trade. Some of these are factors where
Indonesia has shown improvements in recent years. These improvements, if they are continued and intensified, will presumably make Indonesia more attractive for multinational firms, although it will take time before the improvements have more widespread impact on the economy.
It is important to recognize that the business environment is poorer than in many other East Asian countries. Indonesian institutions need to be improved further.
Corruption is one area with some small signs of improvements, but where the situation remains worse than in most other countries in East Asia. Poor institutions and corruption increase the costs of production. Multinational firms that can choose between different locations will tend to stay out of Indonesia unless these issues are addressed. To end the paper on a positive note, there are some provinces that in recent years have been able to implement good policies and improve local institutions. To use these good examples for reforms and changes at a national level would increase inflows of FDI and thereby be fruitful for the continued development of Indonesia. 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2008 Barro and Lee (2010) . 
